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Nevada ex. rel Bd. of Parole Comm’rs v. Morrow, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (May 26, 2011)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – ADMINSTRATIVE LAW 
 
Summary 
 An appeal from a district court order clarifying a judgment granting a writ of mandamus, 
and a proper person appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The appeal from the district order clarifying a judgment granting a writ of mandamus was 
reversed and the order granting the motion to dismiss was affirmed.  
Factual and Procedural History 
Morrow Appeal 
The Nevada Board of Parole (the “Parole Board”) denied Marrow‟s parole.  Morrow 
challenged the Parole Board‟s procedure by filing a writ of mandamus in the district court 
seeking a new parole hearing.
2
 The district court granted the writ and ordered that the Parole 
Board: (1) give Morrow a new hearing; (2) provide him with proper notice of the hearing; (3) 
give him the opportunity to speak or have a representative speak on his behalf at the hearing; and 
(4) provide him with a copy of his risk assessment file.  Morrow received a new hearing, but the 
Parole Board did not provide him notice of the new hearing and Morrow was once again denied 
parole.  Morrow sought a district court order to show cause why the Parole Board should not be 
in contempt.  The district court denied the order to show cause, but directed the Parole Board to 
turn over every document it considered when it denied Morrow Parole.  
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  By Danielle Woodrum. 
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  Morrow argued his due process rights were violate because the board did not notify him of the hearing and denied 
him access to the documents it relied on. 
Kamedula Appeal 
Kamedula was also denied parole.  He argued that the Parole Board violated Nevada‟s 
Open Meeting Law and denied him certain due process rights including the ability to present 
certain evidence and the ability to cross examine witnesses during the hearing. 
Discussion 
 Justice Hardesty, writing for a unanimous three-justice panel of the Supreme Court of 
Nevada held that despite recent Nevada case law recognizing the Parole Board as a quasi-judicial 
body
3
 and discussing the due process protections afforded in quasi-judicial proceedings,
4
 
constitutional due process rights do not attach to parole release hearings because no liberty 
interest is at stake.
5
  
The Court held that Due Process rights do not apply to parole release hearings in Nevada.  
The Court stated that due process protections apply only when government action deprives a 
person of liberty or property and
 that a conviction extinguishes one‟s liberty right to be released 
before the expiration of a valid sentence.
6
  However, the court noted that a state may create an 
“expectancy of release . . . entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.”7  However, the 
Court reasoned that Nevada‟s parole statute8 “only gives rise to a „hope‟ of release on parole” 
and does not create any liberty or property interest sufficient to create a cause of action against 
                                                          
3
  Witherow v .State. Bd. of Parole Comm‟rs, 123 Nev. 305, 311-12, 167 P.3d 408, 412 (2007). 
4
  Stockmeier v. State Dep‟t of Corrections, 122 Nev. 385, 135 P.3d 220 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by 
Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 270, 672 n.6 (2008). 
5
  Id. In Stockmeier, the Court held that Psychological Review Panel hearings were quasi-judicial hearings and 
therefore exempt from Nevada‟s Open Meeting Law. Id. 
6
  Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 443 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). 
7
  Id. 
8
  NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.10705 
the State.
9
  Thus, the Court concluded that Nevada‟s statutes on parole hearings do not create a 
liberty interest sufficient to afford due process protections. 
The Court also reviewed its decision in Stockmeier concerning whether administrative 
proceedings have a “judicial character.” The Court focused on whether such proceedings 
maintained trial-like attributes.
10
  However, the Court held that “[i]nasmuch as Stockmeier has 
caused some confusion about the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings in Nevada, we take this 
opportunity to expressly adopt and clarify the application of the judicial function test in this 
state.” 
The Court noted that a judicial function test determines the nature of an administrative 
hearing by examining the administrative entity‟s functions.11  The Court expressly adopted the 
judicial function test for determining whether entities act in a quasi-judicial manner when 
performing their administrative duties.  Thus, the Court clarified that due process protections 
afforded during a proceeding do not, alone, determine whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial.  
The Court held that procedural protections go to the ability of the hearing entity to hear witnesses 
and make decisions affecting property rights and is only one consideration in determining 
whether the hearing entity is performing a judicial function.    
  
                                                          
9
  Weakland v. Bd. of Parole Comm‟rs 100 Nev. 218, 220 (1984).   
10
  Stockmeier at 391-92, 135 P.3d  at 224.  The Court  linked quasi-judicial proceedings to four due process rights: 
(1) the ability to present and object to evidence; (2) the ability to cross examine witnesses; (3) a written decision 
form the public body; and (4) an opportunity to appeal to a higher authority. Id.  Based on those considerations the 
Court held that Psychological Review Panel hearings did not afford each of those due process rights and were 
therefore not quasi-judicial.  Id.  
11
 Witherow v .State. Bd. of Parole Comm‟rs, 123 Nev. 305, 312, 167 P.3d 408, 412 (2007).  The Court noted the 
factors other jurisdictions look at for the judicial function test are the hearings authority‟s ability to: exercise 
judgment and discretion; hear and determine facts; make binding orders and judgments; affect the personal property 
rights of private persons; examine witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a hearing; and enforce decisions 
or impose penalties.  Craig v. Stafford Const, 856 A.3d 372, 377 (Conn. 2004). 
Conclusion 
Nevada‟s parole release statute does not create a liberty interest sufficient to invoke due 
process protections, therefore inmates are not entitled to constitutional due process protections 
regarding discretionary parole release. The judicial function test is explicitly adopted to 
determine if an administrative hearing is quasi-judicial.  
 
